Schedule of EBSA Conference 2024 and Preconference courses

EBSA Conference 2024 and Preconference courses

Schedule of EBSA Pre conference courses and conference 2024

Day 1, Tuesday, May 14
8:00 - 17:00 Pre conference courses
17:45 - 19:00 Social programme
Day 2, Wednesday, May 15
9:00 - 17:00 Pre conference courses
17:30 - 19:30 Opening reception conference and exhibition
Day 3, Thursday, May 16
8:00 - 8:45 Registration - Coffee - Exhibition
8:45 - 9:00 Opening
9:00 - 9:01 Session 1 - (Novel) Approaches in BioRisk Assessments
9:01 - 9:25 Enhancing Biosafety Risk Assessments through technology and interactive tools: the role of WHO RAST in laboratory settings
9:25 - 9:50 Generic downscaling of containment requirements for work with viral replicons derived from alphaviruses and flaviviruses
9:50 - 10:15 Sleeper Agents in vertebrate DNA: Do Endogenous Retroviruses Pose Hidden Risks?
10:15 - 10:45 Network Coffee - exhibition - Posters
10:45 - 11:45 Session 2 "Biosafety Accelerator Pitch"
11:45 - 12:30 Meet the exhibitors
12:30 - 13:30 Network lunch + exhibition + posters
13:30 - 14:00 PRI-BIO: Tissue Digester Options for Carcass Disposal from Animal Research Facilities
  ERM: Safety Case: A new approach to Risk Management
14:00 - 14:30 Baker: BSC MYTHBUSTERS: CAN 2+ PEOPLE WORK IN A BSC SAFELY?
  Actini: Thermal decontamination and sustainability : How can I become more sustainable ?
14:30 - 15:30 Chris Collins lecture: A history of the world in 8 plagues
15:30 - 16:00 Network Coffee - exhibition - Posters
16:00 - 16:01 Session 3 - Implemeting Biosecurity
16:01 - 16:30 Biosafety, Biosecurity and Dual-Use: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Practical Implementation for Research Institutes
16:30 - 17:00 Implementing biosecurity in an academic environment: a headache?
17:00 - 17:30 Bio- and cyber security solutions for biobanking and data management in high containment laboratories
17:30 - 19:30 EBSA Annual meeting (members only)
20:00 - 22:00 Conference dinner
Day 4, Friday, May 17
8:30 - 8:59 Network coffee and exhitibition
9:00 - 9:01 Session 4 New Technological Advances & Biosafety aspects
9:01 - 9:30 Biosafety & Biosecurity in support of Sustainable Biotechnology
9:30 - 10:00 The convergence of biotechnology and Artificial Intelligence – Opportunities versus biosafety and biosecurity risks
10:00 - 10:30 Biocides destroying antibiotic resistance genes: an experimental investigation
10:30 - 11:00 Network Coffee - exhibition - Posters
11:00 - 11:40 Break-out 1 Incident preparedness and incident management
  Break-out 2 insider threat
  Break-out 3 Solving problems without creating new – Biosafety challenges in the EU Nymphe bioremediation project
  Break out 4 - Biocide Product Regulation and biosafety: new insights and future perspectives
  Break out 5 Bowtie Analysis: A Visual Risk Management Tool
11:40 - 11:50 SWITCH (rerun break-outs)
11:50 - 12:30 Break-out 1 Incident preparedness and incident management
  Break-out 2 insider threat
  Break-out 3 Solving problems without creating new – Biosafety challenges in the EU Nymphe bioremediation project
  Break out 4 - Biocide Product Regulation and biosafety: new insights and future perspectives
  Break out 5 Bowtie Analysis: A Visual Risk Management Tool
12:30 - 13:30 Network lunch + exhibition + posters
13:30 - 13:31 Session 5 Evidence-based Biosafety / Applied Biosafety
13:31 - 14:00 Virucidal activity of standard chemical disinfectants against Ebola virus suspended in tripartite soil and whole blood
14:00 - 14:30 The journey from “literature is always right” to a “trust but verify” culture when deciding upon a decontamination strategy
14:30 - 15:00 Widespread lentiviral plasmid contaminations in research laboratories pose a risk of accidental pseudotyping of lentiviral vectors – an analysis of LVV particles supernatants and plasmids sampled from swiss genetic laboratories
15:00 - 15:15 Closing
15:15 - 15:45 Farewell networkmoment with coffee
  1. From 9:00 to 9:01

    Session 1 - (Novel) Approaches in BioRisk Assessments

  2. From 9:01 to 9:25

    Enhancing Biosafety Risk Assessments through technology and interactive tools: the role of WHO RAST in laboratory settings

    By Sandhya Dhawan

    Laboratory accidents and pathogen escapes are more commonplace than reported. Most laboratory-related incidents are caused by errors in following standard of procedures (SOPs) and emergency response measures, owed to insufficient training or fatigue of workers. To reduce the occurrence of operational errors it is imperative for biosafety training practices to follow a risk-and-evidence based approach. Establishing provisional risk analysis strategies will ensure biosafety encompasses individuals in the lab, as well as the wider community and environment.

     

    As such, the WHO Risk Assessment Tool (WHO RAST) mobile phone application was developed to enable scenario-based risk assessment and evidence-based decision support. The application offers an accessible way to follow the biosafety risk assessment guidelines outlined in the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual 4th edition (LBM4). The WHO RAST app utilises a logic-based algorithm to assess the risk associated with intended laboratory activities in diagnostic, research, or fieldwork settings. The introduction of technology and immersive tools will progress the current biosafety and biosecurity training landscape, by providing an interactive learning environment for laboratory personnel.

     

    To ensure successful implementation of the WHO RAST in biosafety programs and training, the validity of the risk outcomes and control recommendations will be compared against the WHO SEARO Risk Assessment Manual as well as SOPs used in the Mahidol-Oxford Tropical Medicine Research Unit (MORU) laboratory network. The objective of this study is to 1) determine gaps in the WHO RAST app, 2) understand the local feasibility of implementing WHO RAST and other similar learning tools in laboratories, and 3) gather feedback to enhance usability of the app. It is essential for risk assessment processes and tools to be validated prior to implementation to safeguard individuals working in the lab, as well as the general public. Ultimately, an accurate risk prediction model can proactively aid in the prevention of biosafety incidents and improve response capacity of laboratories.

  3. From 9:25 to 9:50

    Generic downscaling of containment requirements for work with viral replicons derived from alphaviruses and flaviviruses

    By Clara Posthuma

    Much research is being done on the development and application of ‘viral replicons’. Viral replicons are derived from viruses (virus vectors) and are used, among other things, in research on vaccines and cancer. Replicons are able to replicate their viral genome, but cannot form new virus particles and are therefore unable to spread further. This is because one or more genes encoding the structural proteins that make up the virus particle have been deleted or replaced by a transgene. If structural proteins are provided externally during production, replicon RNA is packaged in so-called viral replicon particles. Examples of replicons are the self-amplifying mRNA vaccines against COVID-19 and influenza.

    The Netherlands Commission on Genetic Modification (COGEM) is of the opinion that given the characteristics of replicons and viral replicon particles derived from alphaviruses (genus Alphavirus) and flaviviruses (genus Flavivirus), generic downscaling of containment requirements is possible. Depending on which structural genes have been deleted, COGEM advises the following:

    • Laboratory work with ‘naked’ alphavirus or flavivirus replicons can be carried out at containment level I, or at one level lower than the pathogenicity class of the parental virus;
    • Laboratory work with viral replicon particles can be carried out at one level lower than the pathogenicity class of the parental virus;
    • Generic conditions apply to work with both naked replicons and replicon particles: the cells used must contain no related alphaviruses or flaviviruses, and the transgenes used must not restore the removed functions;
    • In addition, viral replicon particle preparations must not contain any virus generated during production that is capable of replicating and spreading.

    When the above conditions are met, COGEM considers that the environmental risks of carrying out work with alphavirus and flavivirus replicons at the stated containment levels are negligible.

  4. From 9:50 to 10:15

    Sleeper Agents in vertebrate DNA: Do Endogenous Retroviruses Pose Hidden Risks?

    By Yaël Vanden Abeele
    Endogenous retroviruses (ERVs) are assumed to be remnants of an infection with exogenous retroviruses that took place during evolution and for which integration has occurred in the genome of a germ cell. ERVs are found in a wide variety of vertebrates whereby their presence varies from only part of the retroviral elements to (virtually) intact ERVs. The majority of ERVs no longer code for functional proteins. However, several ERV sequences have been attributed roles in physiological and potentially also pathological processes. Thus, the presence of ERVs may be a complicating factor in environmental risk assessments impacting the risk rating of biotechnology activities.
    In a study commissioned by the Netherlands Committee for Genetic Modification (COGEM), we aimed to summarize the scientific information on ERVs in respect to their risk for human health and environment during of biotechnology activities involving production and use of genetically modified organisms.
    In brief, ERVs were described in nearly 100 types of cells, cell lines and tissues originating from different vertebrates. Our study confirmed that in most cases ERVs seemed to be limited to partial and incomplete sequences. Activation of transcription and translation of ERVs has been described to occur spontaneously or triggered by an external factor such as a chemical or physical agent, a non-retroviral infection or long-term passaging of host cells. In case incomplete proviral sequences were described, this rarely leads to the production of infectious, replication-competent viruses, although the results may have been biased due to the test methods used. A limited number of studies reported the assembly of virus like particles, infectious virus particles or even replication competent virus particles. Whether or not activation of ERVs, and in particular the production of replication competent particles, creates a risk in the context of biotechnology activities, could not be concluded from the literature study. Therefore, a thorough risk assessment should be performed taking multiple risk factors into account, as summarized in the study.
  5. From 10:45 to 11:45

    Session 2 "Biosafety Accelerator Pitch"

    1. Equipment Design in an Unregulated Environment - Welcome to the Wild West
      by Faye Litherland
    2. A broad introduction to the design and construction of biosafety laboratories in low-resource settings
      by Mark Wheatley
    3. Infectious sample transport: Evaluating the use of Parafilm™ for sealing primary containers
      by Jay Robinson
    4. Biosafety aspects of activities of a high containment area for infectious diseases patients
      by Lucian Lereescu
    5. US's Resilience and Contributions: Safeguarding Research and Community during the COVID-19 Pandemic
      by Suzette De Leon
    6. Implementing Institutional Biorisk Management: Models, Metrics, and Impacts
      by Timothy Burke
    7. Chromatography systems decontamination in multiuser laboratories is key to avoid unwanted biological agent release by Melanie Marchand
    8. ow long does Mpox persist on stationary surfaces? 
      Risk assessment for the release of laboratory equipment or rooms from a BSL-3 facility - a scenario with Mpox by Katja Branitzki-Heinemann
  6. From 11:45 to 12:30

    Meet the exhibitors

    Short presentations from the exhibitors so you know what to expect at their booths.

  7. From 13:30 to 14:00

    PRI-BIO: Tissue Digester Options for Carcass Disposal from Animal Research Facilities

    Animal models are a mainstay component of many research programs.  Options for treatment of tissue after the program ends depends on many things such as animal size and quantity, lab configuration, biosafety levels, personnel risks and local regulations.  Here PRI reviews available options for tissue digesters to address these issues.   Users, lab designers and regulators will get current design and configuration information for use in review of their carcass management.  
  8. From 13:30 to 14:00

    ERM: Safety Case: A new approach to Risk Management

    This presentation will look at how the concept of a Safety Case can be applied to the Biosafety Industry to manage risks associated with the inadvertent release of dangerous pathogens. 
    A Safety Case is a written demonstration of evidence and due diligence provided by an organisation to demonstrate that it has the ability to operate a facility safely and can effectively control hazards.
    Using the ISO 35001 management framework and principles from WHO Biosafety Manual and Industry Good Practice, the Safety Case covers all technical areas of operation including biosafety, biosecurity, process safety and functional safety looking at all aspects of design, operation and maintenance to ensure an acceptable level of risk is maintained.
    The presentation will:
    • Provide a high-level framework for the Safety Case;
    • Show the structure and various elements making up the Safety Case; and,
    • Details the risk assessment methodology.
    This presentation is aimed at those organisations that handle and/or process hazardous pathogens in their facility, specifically aimed at those individuals who have a role in driving and implementing the safety strategy on site.
  9. From 14:00 to 14:30

    Baker: BSC MYTHBUSTERS: CAN 2+ PEOPLE WORK IN A BSC SAFELY?

    Introduction:  
    Biosafety Cabinets (BSCs) are primary containment devices used to help reduce the risk of contamination to the work, the worker, and the surrounding environment.  These devices have rigorous testing and certification to ensure their functional capabilities of contaminant reduction according to NSF International Standard 49 and EN12469 but these BSCs are always tested empty without users present in front of them for a functional baseline.  However, BSC are never used in this manner.  There are known commonly performed actions within BSC operation that may compromise BSC containment.  Here, we address these BSC “myths”, specifically whether two people can work within one BSC and still maintain their intended capacity for particulate containment.
    Method: 
    Two mannequin workers and their simulated experiments were tested for alterations in airflow patterning as measured by smoke visualization, containment of potential contaminates and for cross contamination from each other’s experiment by NSF International Standard 49 dictated aerosol microbiological challenge and particle counting.  Testing was performed in a 6 foot or 1.8 m nominal width Class II “recirculating” BSC.  The ideal distance between the two simulated experiments was also measured.
    Results:  Two people sharing the work surface of a 6 ft or 1.8 m Class II Type A2 BSC were shown to minimally affect visual airflow and particle count measurements, as well as product and personnel protection when using proper recommended procedures.  However, cross contamination was severely compromised such that experiments performed in close proximity could lead to co-contamination or manipulation.  Two sets of moving arms within a BSC showed greater disturbances in airflow, which greatly increases the risk for personnel and product protection loss.  Simulated experiments had to be set up with at least 35 cm of empty space between work zones, leading to an uncomfortable space restriction. 
    Conclusion:
    While the BSC is capable of overcoming a lot of alterations to airflow patterning, there is a great potential for unintended contamination occurring, especially between the two workers.  The two simulated work zones had to be set up with a large empty space in between to limit cross contamination, which creates an uncomfortable work environment.  The increased risk of unintentional contamination from multiple moving arms within the BSC also exponentially increases the risk of entrainment of particulates into the BSC.  It is highly recommended that BSCs should be operated with a single user at all times.
  10. From 14:00 to 14:30

    Actini: Thermal decontamination and sustainability : How can I become more sustainable ?

    The three axes of reflection:
    I reduce the energy consumption
    I limit all the utilities
    I use a green energy
    The themes of sustainability, decarbonization and energy saving have become the main topics in the industry when talking about production.
    To think sustainable, you have to get to the bottom of things and find concrete, reliable solutions that can be applied to the industry.
    ACTINI has been working on this subject for more than 15 years and that is why today we are able to offer reliable sustainable solutions across our entire range.
  11. From 14:30 to 15:30

    Chris Collins lecture: A history of the world in 8 plagues

    By Jonathan Kennedy

    For the first couple of million years that humans existed, our distant relatives survived by hunting and gathering. Then, when the end of the last Ice Age brought a warmer, more stable climate about 12,000 years ago, communities in the Fertile Crescent began to experiment with agriculture. The transition from foraging to farming was a boon for infectious diseases. James C Scott, the American anthropologist, refers to the villages in which early farmers settled as “multi-species resettlement camps”. For the first time, humans lived cheek by jowl with animals and each other. This created unprecedented opportunities for zoonotic pathogens to jump from livestock to humans, and then to spread from person to person. Unsurprisingly, a variety of evidence – from the Yersinia pestis DNA found in 5,000 year old skeletons to the pockmarked bodies of Egyptian mummies – demonstrates that infectious diseases like plague, smallpox and many others first appeared in the wake of the move from hunting and gathering to settled agriculture. Ever since, pathogens have been the protagonists in many of the most important social, political and economic transformations in history.

    Outbreaks of infectious diseases have destroyed millions of lives and decimated whole civilizations, but the devastation has created opportunities for new societies and ideas to emerge and thrive. Germs have played crucial but largely overlooked roles in: the growth of Christianity and Islam from small sects in Palestine and the Hijaz to world religions; the shift from feudalism to capitalism; and the devastation wrought by European colonialism; the emergence of the transatlantic slave trade; and the creation of the modern welfare state. We like to think that pathogens have much less of an impact on the modern world. It is true that advances in medicine and public health have allowed humanity to tame many of the infectious diseases that have devastated humanity since the shift from foraging to farming. Our species is not on the verge of winning the war against pathogens, however. Unprecedented growth in the world’s population, encroachment on animal habitats, industrial-scale factory farming, and ease with which we can travel between far-flung have combined to create the perfect conditions for new microbes to jump the species barrier and spread. We need concerted effort to tackle the threat posed by emerging infectious diseases.

  12. From 16:01 to 16:30

    Biosafety, Biosecurity and Dual-Use: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Practical Implementation for Research Institutes

    By Timo Kehl
    The implementation of robust biosecurity and biosafety measures, in order to ensure the safety of researchers and to prevent the dual use of biological research, is paramount in the realm of modern bioscience. Rapid developments in science and technology pose substantial challenges in monitoring and controlling the spot for biosafety units and its stakeholders on institutional levels. At the German Cancer Research Center (DKFZ), we have established a robust surveillance, emphasizing centralized oversight and comprehensive training, particularly for high-pathogen labs. Our strategy is not only about oversight; it is mainly about integration and  responsiveness. Central to this strategy is a dedicated  Biosafety Department with multiple interfaces and workflows to institutional stakeholders that serves as the linchpin for monitoring and controlling all biological agents and projects at the institute. By consolidating all data related to lab activities, we are equipped to respond swiftly and effectively to any biosecurity concerns.
    The presentation will share insights into the practical approaches and into the  hallenges and fails of implementing these biosafety and biosecurity measures.
  13. From 16:30 to 17:00

    Implementing biosecurity in an academic environment: a headache?

    By Kathrin Summermatter

    Implementing biosecurity requirements in an academic environment, such as a university, presents a constant challenge. On one hand, this topic is often absent from university curricula, and on the other hand, many researchers are unaware of the rules and its implications. Because of their complexity, export controls and dual-use regulations can be overwhelming for many researchers. The scope of biosecurity is also very often underestimated, as it involves not only structural measures but also, for example, the publication of data or the exchange of scientific staff between research institutes. Researchers are very often left alone with their questions and lack a central, competent point of contact understanding biomedical research issues.

    The presentation will discuss the challenges encountered in a university setting and provide an overview of the solutions implemented at the University of Bern, with a critical evaluation from a user's perspective.

  14. From 17:00 to 17:30

    Bio- and cyber security solutions for biobanking and data management in high containment laboratories

    By Julia Rieger

    Introduction

    Sample and data management in high containment laboratories has to meet several biosecurity requirements. These include full traceability of generation, processing, and use of bio-samples as well as protection of data related to these samples such as pathogen sequences and experimental data, which goes hand-in-hand with the needs of proper biobanking information management system (BIMS) and advanced cyber security solution in compliance with international, European and national regulations, standards and guidelines.

    Objectives

    The aim was to establish a BIMS and high-end cyber security for a BSL-3(plus) laboratory for various biospecimens, i.e. human autopsy specimens, primary patient samples, high-risk pathogens, cell lines as well as pathogen sequence data and experimental data. The BIMS has to support a wide range of experimental workflows including sample collection and biobanking of tissues from human autopsies, processing of human swaps and serum samples, isolation and propagation of pathogens, sequencing of pathogens, investigation of pathogen-host interaction, virus neutralization assays in various in vitro models including cultures of human organ slices.

    Material & Methods

    The BIMS is based on the open-source, highly configurable biospecimen management system OpenSpecimen. Data entry forms of OpenSpecimen have been customized to the workflow in a high-containment laboratory with special emphasis on sample traceability. This work included the testing of labels and barcode scanners that work in a BSL-3 environment (i.e., to be properly used with PPE and resistant to various decontamination reagents). Based on users' input, the appropriate software tools are specified and data interchange protocols are defined. The architecture for a quality monitoring system and the secure storage and transmission of sequence data from high-risk pathogens, using a Shamir Secret Sharing encryption technology and Quantum Key Distribution protected connections have been developed. The work was performed in the context of the European Teaming project CY-BIOBANK and the project QCI-CAT of the EuroQCI initiative.

    Results

    OpenSpecimen was implemented in the BSL-3 laboratory at Medical University Graz and successfully tested in a wide range of research projects related to SARS-CoV-2 and other respiratory viruses. The OpenSpecimen implementation for biobanking of high-risk pathogens has been transferred to the biobanks of Cyprus (CY-BIOBANK). Open Specimen is currently extended from BIMS to be used for the management of pathogen sequence data.

    The OpenSpecimen MySQL database is encrypted locally (at rest) by using Shamir Secret Sharing technology provided by fragmentiX. The Secret Sharing algorithm generates information-theoretic secure (ITS) data fragments that can be stored on different S3 storage servers. None of the data fragments contains any information that can be read by an attacker, and in case a server gets damaged a lost data fragment can be recovered from remaining fragments. For secure data transfer between storage servers and cooperation partners (security on transit), we are employing quantum key distribution using the Austrian national-wide quantum communication network that is currently established.

    Conclusion

    The adaption of OpenSpecimen BIMS that covers all processes from the collection of bio-samples containing high-risk pathogens to results from sample analysis can be made available as it is based on an open-source solution. Because of the sensitive nature of high-risk pathogen data it might be necessary to treat at least parts of the data as European Classified Information. Therefore, the required level of protection should be complemented by the use of strong hardened and protected user devices. These examples show how the use of advanced cybersecurity solutions may contribute to improve biosecurity in high containment laboratories.

  15. From 9:00 to 9:01

    Session 4 New Technological Advances & Biosafety aspects

  16. From 9:01 to 9:30

    Biosafety & Biosecurity in support of Sustainable Biotechnology

    By Ursula Jenal

    Biotechnology will be incremental in the process of achieving the UN sustainable development goals. At least 11 fields of biotechnology and 10 top molecular biology techniques have the potential to improve sustainable development according to the UN multi-stakeholder Forum on Science, Technology and Innovation with additional ones evolving regularly. As Jennifer Douda explained in her April 2023 TED-talk, CRISPR's next advance is bigger than you think. CRISPR has the potential to solve much of the methane production problem in dairy animals. But sustainable biotechnology is applicable in many more fields than agricultural biotechnology, i.e. human and veterinary medicine, bioremediation, astrobiology, electrobiology, synthetic biology, production of bio-based instead of petro-based products and energy generation. In all these exciting areas, assessment, mitigation and monitoring of biological and environmental risks are prerequisites for the sustainable use of these techniques and for the development of a sustainable bioeconomy. Not only has biotechnology to be environmentally friendly, but it has to be of true value for society including needs of indigenous populations of various corners of the globe. For these goals to be achieved, we need the integration of biosafety and biosecurity and the participation and interaction of competent biorisk management professionals in all areas of biotechnology. This presentation will cover various developments in biotechnology and how biosafety & biosecurity can support their safe and secure use.

  17. From 9:30 to 10:00

    The convergence of biotechnology and Artificial Intelligence – Opportunities versus biosafety and biosecurity risks

    By Rik Bleijs

    Emerging at the intersection of life sciences and state-of-the-art Artificial Intelligence (AI) capabilities, biotechnological advancements are propelled, enhancing scientists' capacity to engineer living systems beyond conventional boundaries. Key AI tools in this transformative landscape encompass large language models (LLMs), bio-design tools, and AI-enabled automation within the life sciences. The rapid development of AI and its increasing convergence with the life sciences (referred to as AI-bio) unlock enormous potential for human health, transformative opportunities for pandemic preparedness, and the swift development of vaccines and therapeutics.

    Despite the major advantages, AI tools within life sciences may be unintentionally or intentionally misused, posing a significant threat with the potential for a global biological catastrophe. Concerns about this upcoming AI tools in biotechnology are not only voiced by scientists but also by governments and the AI industry itself. Although revolutionary, the democratization of access amplifies the risk landscape, facilitating the manipulation of engineered micro-organisms by an expanding array of actors.

    AI-bio prompts a critical inquiry into the biosafety, biosecurity, and dual-use implications of its capabilities. What are the multifaceted challenges and risks, and what are the potential solutions surrounding the convergence of AI and biotechnology to ensure responsible and secure progress?

  18. From 10:00 to 10:30

    Biocides destroying antibiotic resistance genes: an experimental investigation

    By Suzanne Loret

    Molecular biology laboratories regularly use plasmids carrying at least one antibiotic resistance gene for experimental purposes (selection of transformed bacteria based on their acquired resistance). After discovering bacterial taxa with unexpected resistance plasmids in the university's wastewater pipes, we hypothesized that naturally competent cells in the pipes had taken up undestroyed laboratory plasmids. We then demonstrated that not all biocides are effective DNA destroyers (for more details see: 10.1007/s11356-023-28733-0). Besides explaining the investigation methods used, the presentation will also consider adopting the basic preventive approach: avoiding the use of antibiotic-resistant plasmids in laboratories. Examples of alternative options will be presented.

  19. From 11:00 to 11:40

    Break-out 1 Incident preparedness and incident management

    By René Custers, Mieke Jansen

    The past pandemic crisis demonstrates how vulnerable our society has become to disasters caused by emerging diseases. In order to prepare for future incidents and outbreaks building, testing and implementing an incident management system is crucial. We proactively should have measures and incident response plans in place to prevent, respond to and mitigate incidents that involve biological agents which have the potential to cause harm to human, animal or plant health. Regularly training, drills, and continuous improvement efforts are essential for maintaining a state of readiness.

  20. From 11:00 to 11:40

    Break-out 2 insider threat

    By Ngoc Hoa Chung, Mirjam Schuijff
    In today’s fast evolving (bio)technology landscape companies, organizations, and institutes may face an increasing threat from an insider who may compromise tangible or intangible assets, either intentionally or unintentionally. 
    This break-out session aims to engage participants in an interactive exchange of knowledge about insider threats. To raise awareness, provide valuable insights and best practices for participants, the subjects of understanding and recognizing the insider threat, cultural and behavioral factors, risk assessment and mitigation strategies and technological solutions will be covered. 
    The format of the break-out session will be highly interactive and engaging, thereby balancing between theory and practice with insider threat scenarios, group discussion and a case study to illustrate the key concept of an insider threat. Join us and enhance your knowledge to create a more security-conscious workplace.
  21. From 11:00 to 11:40

    Break-out 3 Solving problems without creating new – Biosafety challenges in the EU Nymphe bioremediation project

    By Patrick Rüdelsheim, Giulio Zanaroli

    Bioremediation addresses the pressing issue of pollution caused by heavy metals, pesticides, hydrocarbons, pharmaceuticals and other contaminants. Organisms acting as natural bioremediators, provide a sustainable alternative to chemical and physical remediation methods.

     

    In this break-out session, we introduce Nymphe, a European project dedicated to tackling environmental pollution by developing innovative bioremediation solutions. The ambition is to remove multiple pollutants (such as microplastics and pesticides in the agricultural soil, and chlorinated solvents and petroleum hydrocarbon in groundwater and sediments in the industrial area) from different contaminated sites in Europe, targeting at least 90% removal of the pollutants that are characteristic of the matrix to be depolluted.

     

    To achieve these goals, Nymphe researchers develop bioremediation/revitalization strategies based on available and new biologics (enzymes, microorganisms, bivalves and earthworms, plants and their holobiont). Combinations of biologics will be assembled in bioremediation systems to be reimplanted in actual contaminated matrices.

     

    While bioremediation holds the promise to be less intrusive and preserving delicate ecosystems, its success depends on responsible practices and adherence to regulations. When assembling complex microbial communities and/or working with organisms modified through modern genetic techniques, it will be challenging to make a robust risk assessment. During the break-out session participants will be invited to discuss their perspectives and thereby contribute to advancing safe application of bioremediation.

  22. From 11:00 to 11:40

    Break out 4 - Biocide Product Regulation and biosafety: new insights and future perspectives

    By Karen van der Meulen, Paul Odinot

    When working with genetically modified organisms (GMO) and/or pathogens, there are strict regulatory requirements defined by, amongst other, the 'contained use' legislation and Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP). One such requirement is the use of validated methods for the inactivation of these GMOs and pathogens. This is where the Biocides Regulation (BPR) comes in. However, for certain applications (e.g. parasite inactivation, disinfection of contaminated liquids, …), there are currently no approved biocides on the market. 

    This breakout session on biocides focuses on the actions taken in the Netherlands and those taken by the EBSA taskforce BPR, including a survey amongst the members. Alongside, we will outline the timeline that the EBSA TF BPR and the Dutch BVF platform (BSO association), the Dutch ministry of Infrastructure and Water-management and the Dutch authorisation board for biocides together with the interest association of biocides producers (Biocides for Europe) are undertaking towards the European Commission in preparation for the refit of the BPR in 2025.

    During the breakout session, the above will be explained in more detail, but there will also be plenty of opportunity to hear from our members if/where there are still issues regarding the use of biocides. The possible issues will be taken into account by the EBSA TF BPR in the route to the EC.

  23. From 11:00 to 11:40

    Break out 5 Bowtie Analysis: A Visual Risk Management Tool

    By Vibeke Vibeke Halkjaer-Knudsen, Jaspreet Chana

    This breakout session will take a detailed look at Bowtie Analysis and how it can be applied to the Biosafety Industry to understand and effectively communicate the risks associated with the inadvertent or intentional release of dangerous pathogens.

    A Bowtie Analysis is a visual risk management tool used since the 1990s, originally developed for and used in high hazard high consequence industries such as chemical, oil and gas, and aviation to communicate and present high hazard scenarios and demonstrate how the risk is being managed within an organisation.

    During the last 15 years the Bowtie Analysis has proven it’s strength and versatility in the Biorisk management (BRM) area.

    The breakout session will cover:

    • Fundamentals of a Risk Assessment  
    • Basics of a Bowtie Analysis
    • A simplified Bowtie Analysis methodology
    • A step-by-step demonstration of a Bowtie Analysis using a real-life industrial example.

    The second half of the session will be an interactive session where delegates in groups can have a go at creating their own Bowtie Analysis using flipcharts and post-it notes before feeding back and discussing with their peers.

    Delegates will leave the breakout session informed about the Bowtie philosophy and the effectiveness of presenting your risk assessments as a visual 'one pager’ to communicate your risk strategy to peers, stakeholders, and regulatory authorities.

    This session is aimed at those organisations that handle and/or process hazardous pathogens in their facility, specifically aimed at those individuals who have a role in driving and implementing the safety strategy on site.

  24. From 11:50 to 12:30

    Break-out 1 Incident preparedness and incident management

    By René Custers, Mieke Jansen

    The past pandemic crisis demonstrates how vulnerable our society has become to disasters caused by emerging diseases. In order to prepare for future incidents and outbreaks building, testing and implementing an incident management system is crucial. We proactively should have measures and incident response plans in place to prevent, respond to and mitigate incidents that involve biological agents which have the potential to cause harm to human, animal or plant health. Regularly training, drills, and continuous improvement efforts are essential for maintaining a state of readiness.

  25. From 11:50 to 12:30

    Break-out 2 insider threat

    By Ngoc Hoa Chung, Mirjam Schuijff
    In today’s fast evolving (bio)technology landscape companies, organizations, and institutes may face an increasing threat from an insider who may compromise tangible or intangible assets, either intentionally or unintentionally. 
    This break-out session aims to engage participants in an interactive exchange of knowledge about insider threats. To raise awareness, provide valuable insights and best practices for participants, the subjects of understanding and recognizing the insider threat, cultural and behavioral factors, risk assessment and mitigation strategies and technological solutions will be covered. 
    The format of the break-out session will be highly interactive and engaging, thereby balancing between theory and practice with insider threat scenarios, group discussion and a case study to illustrate the key concept of an insider threat. Join us and enhance your knowledge to create a more security-conscious workplace.
  26. From 11:50 to 12:30

    Break-out 3 Solving problems without creating new – Biosafety challenges in the EU Nymphe bioremediation project

    By Patrick Rüdelsheim, Giulio Zanaroli

    Bioremediation addresses the pressing issue of pollution caused by heavy metals, pesticides, hydrocarbons, pharmaceuticals and other contaminants. Organisms acting as natural bioremediators, provide a sustainable alternative to chemical and physical remediation methods.

     

    In this break-out session, we introduce Nymphe, a European project dedicated to tackling environmental pollution by developing innovative bioremediation solutions. The ambition is to remove multiple pollutants (such as microplastics and pesticides in the agricultural soil, and chlorinated solvents and petroleum hydrocarbon in groundwater and sediments in the industrial area) from different contaminated sites in Europe, targeting at least 90% removal of the pollutants that are characteristic of the matrix to be depolluted.

     

    To achieve these goals, Nymphe researchers develop bioremediation/revitalization strategies based on available and new biologics (enzymes, microorganisms, bivalves and earthworms, plants and their holobiont). Combinations of biologics will be assembled in bioremediation systems to be reimplanted in actual contaminated matrices.

     

    While bioremediation holds the promise to be less intrusive and preserving delicate ecosystems, its success depends on responsible practices and adherence to regulations. When assembling complex microbial communities and/or working with organisms modified through modern genetic techniques, it will be challenging to make a robust risk assessment. During the break-out session participants will be invited to discuss their perspectives and thereby contribute to advancing safe application of bioremediation.

  27. From 11:50 to 12:30

    Break out 4 - Biocide Product Regulation and biosafety: new insights and future perspectives

    By Karen van der Meulen, Paul Odinot

    When working with genetically modified organisms (GMO) and/or pathogens, there are strict regulatory requirements defined by, amongst other, the 'contained use' legislation and Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP). One such requirement is the use of validated methods for the inactivation of these GMOs and pathogens. This is where the Biocides Regulation (BPR) comes in. However, for certain applications (e.g. parasite inactivation, disinfection of contaminated liquids, …), there are currently no approved biocides on the market. 

    This breakout session on biocides focuses on the actions taken in the Netherlands and those taken by the EBSA taskforce BPR, including a survey amongst the members. Alongside, we will outline the timeline that the EBSA TF BPR and the Dutch BVF platform (BSO association), the Dutch ministry of Infrastructure and Water-management and the Dutch authorisation board for biocides together with the interest association of biocides producers (Biocides for Europe) are undertaking towards the European Commission in preparation for the refit of the BPR in 2025.

    During the breakout session, the above will be explained in more detail, but there will also be plenty of opportunity to hear from our members if/where there are still issues regarding the use of biocides. The possible issues will be taken into account by the EBSA TF BPR in the route to the EC.

  28. From 11:50 to 12:30

    Break out 5 Bowtie Analysis: A Visual Risk Management Tool

    By Vibeke Vibeke Halkjaer-Knudsen, Jaspreet Chana

    This breakout session will take a detailed look at Bowtie Analysis and how it can be applied to the Biosafety Industry to understand and effectively communicate the risks associated with the inadvertent or intentional release of dangerous pathogens.

    A Bowtie Analysis is a visual risk management tool used since the 1990s, originally developed for and used in high hazard high consequence industries such as chemical, oil and gas, and aviation to communicate and present high hazard scenarios and demonstrate how the risk is being managed within an organisation.

    During the last 15 years the Bowtie Analysis has proven it’s strength and versatility in the Biorisk management (BRM) area.

    The breakout session will cover:

    • Fundamentals of a Risk Assessment  
    • Basics of a Bowtie Analysis
    • A simplified Bowtie Analysis methodology
    • A step-by-step demonstration of a Bowtie Analysis using a real-life industrial example.

    The second half of the session will be an interactive session where delegates in groups can have a go at creating their own Bowtie Analysis using flipcharts and post-it notes before feeding back and discussing with their peers.

    Delegates will leave the breakout session informed about the Bowtie philosophy and the effectiveness of presenting your risk assessments as a visual 'one pager’ to communicate your risk strategy to peers, stakeholders, and regulatory authorities.

    This session is aimed at those organisations that handle and/or process hazardous pathogens in their facility, specifically aimed at those individuals who have a role in driving and implementing the safety strategy on site.

  29. From 13:30 to 13:31

    Session 5 Evidence-based Biosafety / Applied Biosafety

  30. From 13:31 to 14:00

    Virucidal activity of standard chemical disinfectants against Ebola virus suspended in tripartite soil and whole blood

    By Hulda R. Jonsdottir

    Proper disinfection and inactivation of highly pathogenic viruses is an essential component of public health and prevention. Depending on environment, surfaces, and type of contaminant, various methods of disinfection must be both efficient and available. To test both established and novel chemical disinfectants against risk group 4 viruses in our maximum containment facility, we developed a standardized protocol and assessed the chemical inactivation of the two Ebola virus variants Mayinga and Makona suspended in two different biological soil loads. Standard chemical disinfectants ethanol and sodium hypochlorite completely inactivate both Ebola variants after 30 s in suspension at 70 % and 0.5 % v/v, respectively, concentrations recommended for disinfection by the World Health Organization. Additionally, peracetic acid is also inactivating at 0.2 % v/v under the same conditions. Continued vigilance and optimization of current disinfection protocols is extremely important due to the continuous presence of Ebola virus on the African continent and increased zoonotic spillover of novel viral pathogens. Furthermore, to facilitate general pandemic preparedness, the establishment and sharing of standardized protocols is very important as it allows for rapid testing and evaluation of novel pathogens and/or chemical disinfectants.

  31. From 14:00 to 14:30

    The journey from “literature is always right” to a “trust but verify” culture when deciding upon a decontamination strategy

    By Karen Gjendal

    How to decide on a decontamination strategy and select the most appropriate decontamination agents? A thorough literature review is the obvious method to use, but is it sufficient?

    This podium presentation will walk the audience through a roadmap of surprises, considerations, and decisions concerning the often used phrase “well, the literature says it is so, then it must be true” to a culture of “trust, but verify”.

    We will take you on tour and share our journey, the meetings, and the confusion and discussions that led us to the realization that there is only so much you can read and so much you can trust. We will discuss how we decided on appropriate decontamination strategies in a new production facility for Rabies and Tickborne Encephalitis vaccines by questioning the “the literature says that this works” and focusing on “this is what actually works in our production facility?”.

    We work with large volumes of highly infectious material, and we have to get it right the first time. Decontamination of live active virus is of outmost importance. We will share with you our thoughts and discussions behind our validation study designs, including finding a laboratory that could assist us with the verification testing we could not do in-house, obtaining the first results and realizing what is written in the literature is not always what is true in real life. We will also share our thoughts and discussions about developing additional studies, revamping our decontamination strategy throughout our facility, and for the first time genuinely understanding our challenges on the production process. Ultimately, we were able to use the results from our validation studies to create a solid decontamination strategy with the most appropriate decontamination agents to minimize the risk of cross contamination in our multiple product GMP vaccine production while also keeping our production and maintenance staff and external service technicians safe when working with pathogenic agents.

  32. From 14:30 to 15:00

    Widespread lentiviral plasmid contaminations in research laboratories pose a risk of accidental pseudotyping of lentiviral vectors – an analysis of LVV particles supernatants and plasmids sampled from swiss genetic laboratories

    By Alina Teuscher

    The ability to insert genes into host genomes makes HIV1-based lentiviral vectors (LVV) a useful and common tool in research and medicine. A safety concern in the use of LVV is the formation of replication-competent lentivirus (RCL) though recombination as lentiviruses in general have a high recombination and mutation rate. Although the safety of LVV has been improved with each generation, by splitting up the essential HIV1 genes onto more plasmids, reducing homologous sequences and using self-inactivating (SIN) vectors, a theoretical potential for recombination remains. Another danger lies in (unintentional) mixing of different LVV types (different generations) and especially with wild-type HIV-1. To assess the potential risk of mix-ups and replication in laboratories using LVV, we collected LVV samples (plasmids, vector particles, cell supernatants) from public sources or obtained directly from research laboratories and tested them for their identity and the genes they contain. While we could not detect any recombination in the samples obtained, we found a high amount of contaminated LVV plasmids. Experiments with VSV-G carrying plasmids to trace the contaminations pointed to a general problem with centrifugation during DNA preparation. On top, the level of contaminations observed was sufficient to result in VSV-G pseudotyped LVV in otherwise VSV-G-free LVV packaging systems. Our experiments indicate that contaminations of as little as 0.32 nl of an average pMD2.G (popular VSV-G plasmid) Mini Prep (450 ng/μl) could have significant biosafety consequences if the contaminating plasmids lead to an accidental pseudotyping.

Register

Sorry, the registration period is over.

Prices

Ticket type Price
Member conference ticket 2024 € 605.00
Member conference ticket 2024 + conference dinner € 655.00
Member conference ticket 2024 + conference dinner + printed conference book € 705.00
Member conference ticket 2024 + printed conference book € 635.00
Non-Member conference ticket 2024 € 710.00
Non-member conference ticket 2024 + conference dinner € 780.00
Non-member conference ticket 2024 + conference dinner + printed conference book € 810.00
Non-member conference ticket 2024 + printed conference book € 740.00

                                    | EBSA member | non member
Register before
February 1st 2024
Super Early Bird
Conference ticket             |            440 €    |     570 €
Printed conference book  |              25 €    |       25 €
Conference dinner           |              65 €    |       65 €


Register before
March 1st  2024
Conference ticket             |            505 €    |     605 €
Printed conference book  |              30 €    |       30 €
Conference dinner           |              70 €    |       70 €

Register from
March 1st 2024 onwards
Conference ticket             |            605 €    |     710 €
Printed conference book  |              30 €    |       30 €
Conference dinner           |              70 €    |       70 €

All prices are including Belgian VAT