Schedule of EBSA Conference 2026 and Preconference courses

Biological incident investigations in medical entomology laboratories require a structured, multi layered approach to understand potential exposure pathways and strengthen institutional risk governance. Following the detection of a malaria infection in an employee working across two mosquito research facilities (Institution A and Institution B), an independent and comprehensive process was initiated. This process included phased verification of the biological agent involved, systematic mapping of activities during the potential exposure period, facility assessments, document and SOP reviews, and structured interviews with personnel.

The investigative framework applied principles from occupational incident analysis, biosafety governance, and integrated biorisk management. Particular attention was given to harmonising information from different organisational domains, identifying latent procedural vulnerabilities, and evaluating how operational, technical, and cultural factors interact within complex laboratory systems.

The process not only informed immediate risk mitigation steps but also provided a blueprint for strengthening long term organisational resilience. This incident illustrates how a rare event can reveal important latent structural risks and underscores the need for integrated, layered, and robust biorisk management.

High-containment laboratories (BSL-3 and BSL-4) protect personnel and the environment through layered controls, but day-to-day safety ultimately depends on whether people can consistently perform critical steps under pressure, fatigue, and routine. Although the peer-reviewed literature increasingly discusses training for these settings, it remains unclear which training components are shared across institutions, and which “human factors” are described that help translate rules into reliable performance.

To clarify what the field currently reports, we conducted a structured review of recent peer-reviewed studies addressing high-containment laboratory training practices. PubMed, Embase, Web of Science, Scopus, and Ovid MEDLINE were last searched on September 1, 2024. We included english-language papers published between 2019 and 2024 that described, evaluated, or critically discussed training protocols, safety practices, or personnel challenges specific to BSL-3 or BSL-4 environments. Findings were synthesized using deductive thematic analysis, and each paper was coded for the presence of predefined training-related elements.

Across 24 eligible studies, the dominant pattern was a strong emphasis on procedural compliance with comparatively limited attention to the human and organizational mechanisms that enable safe performance in high-consequence work. Training, evaluation, and certification were most often presented as local, rule-based activities, while shared competency standards and behavioral principles were seldom articulated. Similarly, systems that support learning and adaptation,such as routine incident and near-miss reporting, explicit behavioral guidance for decision-making in degraded conditions, or structured assessment of work ability appeared infrequently. Taken together, the literature tends to frame training as a means to prevent rule violations rather than as a framework for managing predictable human limitations in demanding environments. This imbalance suggests a systemic gap: high-containment training is described as ensuring adherence, but is rarely documented as strengthening decision-making, resilience, and performance stability when conditions are less than ideal.

Recent publications therefore provide useful descriptions of local compliance-focused approaches, but they rarely document shared competency definitions, explicit behavioral foundations, structured work-ability monitoring, or incident-driven learning loops. Future training programs—and the way they are reported—may be strengthened by clearer competency frameworks and more transparent description of the systems that help people work safely and consistently in high-containment settings.

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Animal venoms serve as an important model system across multiple research fields, including biomolecular, medicinal, and evolutionary biology. To support this work, researchers must collect from the field and maintain venomous organisms in controlled laboratory settings, enabling year-round venom extraction and downstream analyses. However, managing these animals in a research environment involves significant risks. These include:

1. collecting venomous animals in the field,
2. transporting and maintaining them safely in the laboratory,
3. extracting venoms securely, and
4. handling raw venoms with appropriate precautions.

Each step carries inherent danger and therefore requires careful study, documentation, and risk assessment.

Working closely with compliance teams is essential to ensure that safety protocols are thoughtfully designed, implemented, and followed to protect both the animals and the researchers. Our research program investigates the evolution of venomous snakes and their venoms, focusing on the ecological and evolutionary forces that have shaped the diversity of venoms and the animals that possess them. My aim is to integrate our understanding of venom evolution with best practices in field and laboratory safety to determine how venomous species can be responsibly maintained and studied in a research setting. In our field, we must understand that accidents may happen; thus, preplanning is a critical aspect in both field and laboratory research dealing with venomous creatures. In the field, having a team member wilderness first aid certified, carrying a satellite phone or other emergency response device, and identification of local hospitals near your field site with emergency protocols in place that all team members understand is a must. Having international insurance and potentially a global rescue policy should be discussed. In a laboratory setting, accidents may happen as well. Thus, integrating local emergency personnel into the response plan can help immensely. An example would be bringing their team into the facility and designing pickup locations if an incident were to happen. Having a relationship with a medical professional that understands venomous exposures and setting up incidence response procedures is critical preplanning. I suggest running exposure scenarios prior to housing venomous creatures to help mitigate the inherent risk when conducting this type of research. Ultimately, there is risk working in the field or with venomous creatures, my goal is to reduce the inherent risks via proper planning to improve overall safety and mitigate potential hazards.

Highlight: Animal venoms provide powerful research models, but working with venomous species requires careful risk assessment and rigorous safety protocols from field collection to laboratory handling. Our program integrates studies of venom evolution with best practices in field and lab safety to ensure venomous organisms can be responsibly maintained and investigated

The Institut Pasteur du Cambodge (IPC) recently achieved ISO 35001:2019 certification through an external audit conducted by MUTU International (Indonesia). This milestone reflects a deliberate effort to strengthen and harmonize biorisk management within a high-containment laboratory environment that supports both national public health functions and international research, surveillance, and collaborative projects. This contribution presents the IPC experience as a practical case study of how a shared international framework can enhance coherence, accountability, and interoperability across institutional and geographic boundaries. IPC operates BSL-3 laboratories that are central to national diagnostic and surveillance capacity for tuberculosis, avian influenza, SARS-CoV-2, and other zoonotic diseases, while simultaneously engaging in multi-country research consortia and cross-border scientific collaborations. Prior to ISO 35001 implementation, biosafety practices were fragmented across pathogens, procedures, and project-specific workflows, resulting in parallel approaches to risk assessment, inconsistent documentation of near-misses, and unclear escalation and reporting pathways. Biosafety governance was largely embedded within quality management structures such as ISO 17025. The adoption of ISO 35001 provided a unifying Biorisk Management System (BMS), integrating biosafety governance across units, clarifying responsibilities, formalizing incident reporting and management review, and supporting a transition from reactive safety practices toward preventive, risk-based management.

Implementation followed a phased and pragmatic approach, deliberately building on an already well-functioning high-containment environment. Prior to ISO 35001 adoption, IPC operated a mature BSL-3 facility supported by an established BSL-3 manual, regular staff training, and comprehensive pathogen- and procedure-specific SOPs. The implementation therefore focused less on creating technical controls from scratch and more on aligning existing practices within a coherent governance framework. The process began with a structured gap analysis, followed by document harmonization, clarification of roles and reporting pathways, and targeted awareness-raising across scientific, technical, and support units. Pilot implementation in BSL-3 laboratories was complemented by internal audits, corrective actions, and formal management review, ultimately culminating in successful certification. Critical to this process was early and sustained leadership engagement. Institutional leadership committed to the allocation of necessary resources, including additional personnel to support expanded documentation, coordination, and monitoring requirements. Equally important was the early involvement of all relevant internal stakeholders (laboratory staff, biosafety professionals, quality management, facility management, and occupational health) ensuring shared ownership of the system and facilitating integration of ISO 35001 into routine operations. Early “quick wins,” such as simplified incident reporting and formal recognition of safe practices, reinforced trust in the system and helped sustain momentum throughout implementation.

Beyond its relevance in low- and middle-income settings, this experience demonstrates the value of ISO 35001 for European laboratories operating within dense and heterogeneous regulatory landscapes. Rather than duplicating national requirements, ISO 35001 offers a common language and governance structure that facilitates interoperability between institutions, supports workforce mobility, and enables consistent biorisk management across multi-partner projects and international consortia. The IPC case illustrates how ISO 35001 can function as a connective framework, strengthening alignment across regions, disciplines, and organizations, and reinforcing trust, transparency, and resilience within global biorisk management networks.

Pandemic preparedness is not primarily limited by scientific knowledge, but by fragmentation of infrastructures, workflows, standards, and decision-making processes. The project results presented here close this gap by changing the way high- and maximum-containment research infrastructures operate and, above all, collaborate and respond to emerging infectious threats.

By integrating access to high-containment laboratories, viral resources, and other infrastructures such as large-scale data infrastructures, and by harmonizing cross-border workflows and processes, we are moving from isolated capacities to coordinated capabilities and opportunities. Researchers gain simplified, secure, and traceable access to a continuum of services—from early-stage research to advanced experimental testing, while infrastructures are operated under aligned quality, governance, and biosafety frameworks.

One important result is the measurable strengthening of biosafety and biorisk management. Biorisk management is the backbone of safe, rapid, and globally coordinated research with highly pathogenic agents. Thanks to harmonized procedures and trained personnel we can quickly move across the full research continuum—from basic studies to applied countermeasures while ensuring the safety of all people and the environment. In this talk, I will show how integrating these capabilities with international partnerships translates preparedness from a plan into operational reality. Harmonised SOPs, shared quality standards, and joint training create comparable safety levels across facilities and enable the rapid and safe mobilization of expertise in health crises. At the same time, transparency and shared visibility of critical resources—such as virus isolates, reagents, and data—reduce duplication, mitigate supply chain vulnerabilities, and accelerate response timelines.

A central element of our approach is the active engagement of international partners. By building further cross-border partnerships, sharing best practices, and aligning operational, safety and quality standards, we create a globally interconnected research ecosystem. This not only enhances the EU’s capacity for pandemic preparedness, but also fosters a continuous cycle of learning, improvement, and innovation across borders. Through the ongoing integration of expertise and resources worldwide, the infrastructure network evolves dynamically, remains resilient under emerging threats and contributes to a globally harmonised, responsible, and forward-looking approach to biosafety and epidemic response.

The result is a shift from reactive crisis management to structural preparedness: shorter timelines from foundational science to actionable pandemic interventions, improved biosafety under surge conditions and a resilient European and global infrastructure landscape ready to respond to the next emergence of a high-risk pathogen. In this oral presentation, I will show you how we turned these ambitions into operational reality and how the same model can be extended to further strengthen preparedness, global cooperation and biosafety as well as biorisk management.

These results were achieved as part of the projects INTERCEPTOR, EU 101132215 and EVORA, EU 101131959.

To conclude the first day of the EBSA Conference, we will organise an interactive Q&A session with leading experts in Biosafety and Biosecurity (biorisk management). Questions from conference attendees and preconference course participants will be discussed in an open panel discussion, creating an opportunity for dialogue and knowledge exchange.

Spatial decontamination is a cornerstone of laboratory biosafety, typically employing gaseous or vaporous agents in sealed areas for maintenance or emergencies. However, in high-containment facilities like the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP), standard methods are impractical for expansive, unsealed(able) spaces such as effluent treatment plants.

ACDP conducts diagnostics and research on diverse pathogens affecting animals, humans, aquatics, and the environment. The effluent treatment plant, covering approximately 10,000 cubic meters, collects and decontaminates liquid waste from all BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories and animal facilities, centralising hazards and amplifying the consequences of mechanical failures.

In early 2025, ACDP employed particle dynamic modelling to predict particle dispersal from three critical failure points in the effluent treatment plant, incorporating airflow patterns to designate contamination zones. The Biorisk Management Group then implemented a risk-based zonal strategy using aerosolised hydrogen peroxide and enzymatic indicators (EIs) to quantify efficacy in open areas under normal airflow.

Unlike biological indicators, EIs provide quantifiable log-reduction measurements (e.g., 10^2.5 to 10^9) as a measure of decontamination efficacy which were essential to making risk-based determinations for decontamination zones with appropriate safety margins. A quantifiable dilution of hydrogen peroxide efficacy was measured in open space with normal HVAC operation while achieving >10^5 efficacy in a target zone. The target zone aligned with a predicted contamination area from the particle dynamic models and gradients for safety margins beyond this target zone.

These findings enable targeted decontamination in non-laboratory settings, maximising efficacy in high-risk zones, enhancing staff safety, and minimising chemical use by avoiding broad, uniform applications unrelated to risk.

The scope of this paper is to present a model of a bio-risk analysis in the facilities of Institute of Diagnosis and Animal Health (IDAH) from Bucharest, Romania, that is the national reference laboratory for diagnosis of animal diseases IDAH, when a new method of analysis with potentially infectious micro-organism was to be introduced in the lab activity, in order to assure all safety conditions for working in the lab.

The bio-risk analysis, the first step of bio-risk management, was performed in January 2024 for one of the facilities of the department of Bacteriology, Parasitology, Micology and Micotoxicology, when the new Standard Operational Procedure (SOP) was elaborated: SOP 19 Bacteriology “Isolation of methicillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA)”, in conformity with the European Union (EU) decision 2023/1017 for modifying of EU decision 2020/1729 concerning the monitoring of methicillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus in the fattening pigs.

The identified bio-risk was laboratory achieving infection (LAI).
For the analysis of this bio-risk, it was necessary to:

1. answer at the following question: WHAT?, WHO?, WHERE?, WHEN?, HOW?, related the agent properties, laboratory infrastructure, laboratory procedures, human factors, operation factors, environment and community factors,
2. establish a graphic representation of risk probability and consequences and calculate the impact of the risk as a product of multiplication between the probability and consequences in 2 situations: without and with measures of mitigation.
3. evaluation of risk as acceptable.

In the second step, we analyzed the existing mitigation measures in our organization and thought about another control measures according with hierarchy of 5 categories of risk mitigation measures from effectiveness point of view:

1. Risk elimination or substitution
2. Engineering controls
3. Administrative controls
4. Practices and procedures
5. Protective Personal Equipment.

The third step, we evaluated the performance, that means improving bio-risk management by recording, measuring and evaluating organizational actions and outcomes to reduce biorisk.

In conclusion, the combining of mitigation measures depends on the institution tools: costs, feasibility, management past concerns and, but not at least, any person that works in the lab.

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High-reliability organisations are capable of managing catastrophic risks within their routine operations without compromising the public trust. A robust institutional culture of biosafety and biosecurity is essential for the resilience of high-reliability organisations working in life sciences such as biomedical laboratories and research and innovation facilities. Rapid technological change in life sciences manifested in the digital transformation of research practices and workplaces offers tremendous benefits in terms of enhanced efficiency, precision, and analytical power. As life scientists take advantage of these opportunities, it is important that existing biosafety and biosecurity risk management frameworks are properly adjusted and calibrated so that they remain relevant and effective.

Compliance with biosafety and biosecurity standards and regulations requires a shared understanding what risks can occur within a facility, as well as a vibrant institutional system of written and unspoken rules how these risks can be prevented, and what mitigation measures should be adopted in case of an accident or incident.

Most conceptual models view a biosafety and biosecurity culture as a static phenomenon made up of tangible artefacts, e.g. institutional mission statements, standard operating procedures (SOP), codes of conduct, and training programmes. This presentation revisits existing conceptual models to provide a framework for approaching biosafety and biosecurity culture as a dynamic phenomenon which is nurtured and maintained through interactions. It identifies key enablers of the sustainability of risk management practices within institutions. It then reviews the role of new technologies, particularly AI-powered tools in supporting biosafety and biosecurity risk management and examines how the application of these tools impacts on established interactions that underpinned institutional cultures.

The proposed framework has implications for monitoring and assessing the performance of biosafety and biosecurity culture. More importantly, it offers a tool for understanding the impact of technological change on life science work cultures and can serve as a roadmap for adapting biosafety and biosecurity risk management approaches to the new realities brought about by increasing digitalisation, automation, and use of AI technologies. 

Nucleic-acid-based technologies such as naked DNA, plasmids, mRNA and gene-editing systems are rapidly expanding in medical and veterinary applications. While these technologies allow for precise and often transient genetic alterations, they raise questions about how they fit within current regulatory frameworks for genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Regulatory differences have emerged between in vivo and in vitro applications, as well as between human and veterinary uses, further complicated by varying interpretations among European member states.

In the Netherlands, a precautionary interpretation places applications involving the introduction of naked DNA into human or animal cells within the scope of GMO legislation - even when genetic expression is temporary - creating a clear divergence from the approach adopted by most EU Member States. This presentation shares our findings of a study commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management, assessing whether the current regulatory treatment of naked DNA remains adequate, proportionate and future-proof. The analysis draws on an in-depth review of European and national legislation, regulatory practice, scientific risk assessments and international comparisons.

The study confirms that the regulatory scope is driven more by legal definitions and techniques than by risk profiles, creating inconsistencies between similar technologies and applications. This also raises questions of mandate regarding which authority is responsible for specific safety aspects and the integration of health and environmental considerations. Four policy options are proposed to improve coherence, proportionality, and alignment with EU practice, supported by clearer interpretation and stronger inter-agency cooperation.

High-containment laboratories (HCLs) are expanding worldwide as countries invest in infectious disease research and health security. These facilities are essential for developing vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics, but their rapid growth has outpaced transparency

and consistent oversight. Confidence in compliance with the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is weakened by these variations in regulatory capacity and reporting.

Emerging technologies can help address these challenges. Artificial intelligence (AI) and distributed ledger technology (DLT) can strengthen national biosafety systems through enhanced data integrity, traceability and transparency in HCLs. Three use cases illustrate prospective applications: AI-enabled DNA screening to manage synthesis risks; safeguarding laboratory data and records with AI and DLT to improve accountability; and DLT-backed provenance tracking to monitor pathogen materials.

Embedded within national oversight frameworks, these tools could enhance transparency and collaboration through more standardized reporting. In this way they could reinforce biological weapons prohibition norms and build confidence in peaceful intent.

The integration of artificial intelligence, robotics, and advanced automation into research laboratories is accelerating scientific discovery while fundamentally altering how experimental decisions are made. As laboratory systems gain greater autonomy, traditional biosafety and biosecurity frameworks, designed around human-directed workflows, face new, under-examined challenges. This presentation examines the emerging biosafety, biosecurity, and dual-use risks associated with AI-enabled autonomous laboratory systems, with a particular focus on environments handling biological, chemical, or otherwise hazardous materials. Drawing on a recent peer-reviewed risk assessment, the talk identifies key vulnerability domains, including system autonomy, data governance, cyberbiosecurity, insider risk, and the erosion of human-in-the-loop oversight. Rather than focusing on technological capability, the presentation emphasizes practical risk-mitigation strategies relevant to biosafety professionals, facility managers, and institutional oversight bodies. These include tiered experiment approval models, traceability and auditability of automated decisions, integration of dual-use risk assessment into experimental design, and the role of biosafety programs in governing autonomous research infrastructure.

Biosafety professionals play a critical role in protecting people, the environment, and research integrity, yet their work often goes unseen until something goes wrong. Communicating the value of biosafety programs to upper management and stakeholders can be challenging, particularly when success is defined by the absence of incidents. This presentation will explore strategies for developing and leveraging meaningful metrics to demonstrate the impact and effectiveness of biosafety programs.

We will discuss:

1. Identifying and tracking key performance indicators (KPIs) that reflect biosafety program goals and objectives
2. Using data visualization and storytelling to communicate complex information to non-technical stakeholders
3. Fostering a culture of continuous improvement through regular program assessment and feedback
4. Aligning biosafety program metrics with organizational priorities and strategic objectives

By focusing on proactive and predictive indicators, biosafety professionals can translate their work into compelling narratives that resonate with upper management, fostering program support and resources. This talk aims to empower biosafety professionals to articulate their contributions, drive continuous improvement, and ultimately enhance the safety and success of their organizations.

Ever wondered why some safety conversations spark collaboration while others ignite resistance? The answer may lie in the brain. Join me for a lively exploration of David Rock’s SCARF model—a neuroscience-based framework that explains how Status, Certainty, Autonomy, Relatedness, and Fairness shape human behavior. For over a decade, I’ve used these principles to turn compliance into connection and transform tense moments into trust-building opportunities. In this session, we’ll unpack the science behind SCARF, discover why it matters for biosafety professionals around the globe, and explore practical strategies to apply it in real-world research settings. Expect personal stories, surprising insights, and actionable tips that will make your safety culture not just stronger—but smarter. Come ready to rethink how you lead, influence, and inspire in the lab and beyond!