Schedule of EBSA Conference 2023 and Preconference courses

EBSA Conference 2023 and Preconference courses

Schedule of EBSA Pre conference courses and conference 2023

Day 1, Tuesday 18 April
9:00 - 17:00 Pre conference courses
17:30 - 19:00 Social programme
Day 2, Wednesday 19 April
9:00 - 17:00 Pre conference courses
  Meet the council (15:00 - 17:00)
17:30 - 19:30 Opening reception conference and exhibition
Day 3, Thursday 20 April
8:00 - 8:45 Registration - Coffee - Exhibition
8:45 - 9:00 Opening
9:00 - 9:01 Session 1 - Outbreak Response
9:01 - 9:25 From laboratory containment and beyond - the role of biosafety and biosecurity during outbreaks
9:25 - 9:50 Public Health Communication in a Crisis. The covid -19 experience
9:50 - 10:15 Mpox and the environment: implications for infection control
10:15 - 10:45 Network Coffee - exhibition
10:45 - 12:30 Session 2 "Biosafety Accelerator Pitch"
12:30 - 13:30 Network lunch + exhibition
13:30 - 14:00 Energy Recovery for Batch Thermal Effluent Decontamination Systems (PRI Bio)
  Poster presentation
14:00 - 14:30 Product/service presentation AAF International
  Poster presentation
14:30 - 15:30 Chris Collins lecture
15:30 - 16:00 Network Coffee - exhibition
16:00 - 16:01 Session 3 - BioRisk Management of Athropods activities
16:01 - 16:30 Introduction on Arthropods
16:30 - 17:00 Handling ticks and tick-host studies in high-containment labs
17:00 - 17:30 Biorisk Management of Athropods activities - TBC
17:30 - 19:00 EBSA Annual meeting (members only)
19:30 - 22:00 Conference dinner
Day 4, Friday 21 April
8:15 - 8:45 Network coffee and exhitibition
8:45 - 8:46 Session 4 Biodiversity - one word diverse impact
8:46 - 9:10 The International Expert Group of Biosafety and Biosecurity Regulators (IEGBBR)
9:10 - 9:35 How to strengthen laboratory biosecurity within your organization: The importance of biosecurity awareness
9:35 - 10:00 Biosecurity in animal production to improve animal health and reduce antimicrobial use
10:00 - 10:30 A broad Biosecurity program in Greece
10:30 - 11:00 Network Coffee - exhibition
11:00 - 11:40 Break-out 1 - Biocides product regulation – challenges in biosafety
  Break-out 2 - Emerging Diseases in EasternEurope/mediterranean region
  Break-out 3 - New genomic Techniques
  Break out 4 - Plant quarantine
  Break out 5 - BioRisk challenges in relation to contained activities on Prion (like) Diseases
  Break out 6 - Human factors. "Local rationality" and the difference between intentional and unintentional human failures
11:40 - 11:50 SWITCH (rerun break-outs)
11:50 - 12:30 Break-out 1 - Biocides product regulation – challenges in biosafety
  Break-out 2 - Emerging Diseases in EasternEurope/mediterranean region
  Break-out 3 - New genomic Techniques
  Break out 4 - Plant quarantine
  Break out 5 - BioRisk challenges in relation to contained activities on Prion (like) Diseases
  Break out 6 - Human factors. "Local rationality" and the difference between intentional and unintentional human failures
12:30 - 13:30 Network lunch + exhibition
13:30 - 13:31 Session 5 Evidence-based Biorisk Management
13:31 - 14:00 Evidence-based risk analyses for Maximum Containment Laboratories
14:00 - 14:30 Showering-out in polio essential facilities: from requirement to evidence-based consideration
14:30 - 15:00 BioSafteyCabinets mythbusters: Does heat really affect my protection?
15:00 - 15:30 Empirical Studies in Biosafety
15:30 - 15:45 Closing
15:45 - 16:15 Farewell networkmoment with coffee
  1. From 9:01 to 9:25

    From laboratory containment and beyond - the role of biosafety and biosecurity during outbreaks

    By Åsa Szekely Björndal

    The presentation will outline of the importance of the biosafety and biosecurity community for managing oubreaks. Some components of biorisk management in the outbreak response during some recent outbreaks (e.g. ebola, zika, COVID-19, mpox) will be highlighted.

  2. From 9:25 to 9:50

    Public Health Communication in a Crisis. The covid -19 experience

    By Alkiviadis Vatopoulos

    In this communication the experience gained, problems encountered and lessons learned by the way risk communication during the COVID-19 pandemic was developed and delivered will be disused.

  3. From 9:50 to 10:15

    Mpox and the environment: implications for infection control

    By Allan Bennett OBE

    Mpox is an emerging zoonotic infection originating in small mammals in parts of Africa. Imported cases have occurred in Europe over recent years and have been managed in specialist isolation facilities. However, in 2022, a global outbreak occurred mainly amongst the GBMSM community. In order to control and better understand transmission of the virus and series of environmental investigations were carried out to detect the virus on the air, in dust and on surfaces in a variety of environments including domestic settings, isolation rooms, offices and sexual health clinics. The results of these studies will be discussed along with implications for infection control.

  4. From 10:45 to 12:30

    Session 2 "Biosafety Accelerator Pitch"

    The best poster entries will be selected to give a pitch for all conference attendees on their poster.

    Best presentation wins the Best EBSA2023 poster prize!

  5. From 13:30 to 14:00

    Energy Recovery for Batch Thermal Effluent Decontamination Systems (PRI Bio)

    Minimizing energy use is a mandate for most building designers and operators.  This is true for buildings as a whole as well as for individual systems.  For users of Thermal Batch Effluent Decontamination Systems minimizing energy and energy recovery have been largely ignored due to many hurdles in implementation of energy saving technologies.  This presentation discusses a number of options for energy recovery and discusses pro and cons of each approach as well as the implications on system design.  The attendee will gain an understanding of the various philosophies and how best choose a design to meet their particular need.  The presentation is intended for designers, specifiers and users of Batch Thermal Systems.

    pribio

  6. From 14:00 to 14:30

    Product/service presentation AAF International

    More details will be available soon.

    aaf

  7. From 14:30 to 15:30

    Chris Collins lecture

    By Jean-Micel Claverie

    Environmental virology began with efforts to detect infectious poliovirus in sewage and water more than 50 years ago, and then progressively extended to other known human-infecting viruses using molecular biology approaches [1, 2]. More recently it has become an additional component in global studies of the microbial diversity throughout our planet (such as the Tara Ocean projects [3, 4]). Beyond the studies originally limited to known human-infecting virus, we are now attempting to catalog unknown viruses infecting unknown hosts [5]. The latest developments introduced a temporal dimension, with the investigation of viruses from the distant past, such as those trapped in millennia-old permafrost layers, which I will briefly describe [6-8]. Within the One Health framework many teams are now investigating the viromes of the most remote and pristine areas where very few men had gone before [9]. Worse, under the pretext of anticipating future pandemics, these samples are sometimes subjected to hazardous manipulations [10]. To what extent these environmental investigations should be more closely monitored without renouncing to the scientific knowledge they bring us about the key role of viruses in most ecosystems, deserves a rigorous debate [11].

    References

    1. Melnick JL. (1947) Poliomyelitis virus in urban sewage in epidemic and nonepidemic times.
      Am. J. Hyg 45: 240-253
    2. Metcalf TG, Melnick JL, Estes MK (1995) Environmental virology: from detection of virus in sewage and water by isolation to identification by molecular biology--a trip of over 50 years.
      Annu Rev Microbiol 49: 461-487. doi: 10.1146/annurev.mi.49.100195.002333.
    3. Karsenti E, et al. (2011)
      A holistic approach to marine eco-systems biology.
      PLoS Biol. 9(10): e1001177. doi: 10.1371/journal.pbio.1001177.
    4. Hingamp P, et al. (2013)
      Exploring nucleo-cytoplasmic large DNA viruses in Tara Oceans microbial metagenomes.
      ISME J. 7(9): 1678-95. doi: 10.1038/ismej.2013.59.
    5. Roux S, Emerson JB. (2022)
      Diversity in the soil virosphere: to infinity and beyond?
      Trends Microbiol. 30(11):1025-1035. doi: 10.1016/j.tim.2022.05.003.
    6. Legendre M, et al. (2014)
      Thirty-thousand-year-old distant relative of giant icosahedral DNA viruses with a pandoravirus morphology.
      Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 111(11):4274-9. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1320670111.
    7. Rigou S, Santini S, Abergel C, Claverie JM, Legendre M. (2022)
      Past and present giant viruses diversity explored through permafrost metagenomics.
      Nat Commun. 13(1):5853. doi: 10.1038/s41467-022-33633-x.
    8. Alempic JM, Lartigue A, Goncharov AE, Grosse G, Strauss J, Tikhonov AN, Fedorov AN, Poirot O, Legendre M, Santini S, Abergel C, Claverie JM. (2022)
      An update on eukaryotic viruses revived from ancient permafrost bioRxiv 2022.11.10.515937; doi: 10.1101/2022.11.10.515937
    9. Sikkema RS, Marion P.G. Koopmans MPG. (2021)
      Preparing for Emerging Zoonotic Viruses, Encyclopedia of Virology (4th Edition), 2021: 256-266. doi: 10.1016/B978-0-12-814515-9.00150-8
    10. Chen, DY., et al. (2023)
      Spike and nsp6 are key determinants of SARS-CoV-2 Omicron
      BA.1 attenuation. Nature, doi: 10.1038/s41586-023-05697-2
    11. Imperiale MJ, Casadevall A, Goodrum FD, Schultz-Cherry S. (2022)
      Virology in Peril and the Greater Risk To Science.
      J Virol. 15: e0184722. doi: 10.1128/jvi.01847-22.
  8. From 16:01 to 16:30

    Introduction on Arthropods

    By Eva Veronesi

    Introduction by the EBSA focal point on this topic, Eva Veronesi

  9. From 16:30 to 17:00

    Handling ticks and tick-host studies in high-containment labs

    By Aysen Gargili Keles

    Tick-borne diseases (TBD) have a worldwide impact on animal and human health and one of the concerns for zoonotic disease studies. In order to be able to work on the TBDs it is necessary to establish laboratory colonies of the relevant tick species and conduct tick-host animal experiments. Most of the identification and colony rearing studies are done in BSL2 laboratories, however some tick-host studies and agents need to be studied in high containment laboratories because their exotic nature in the countries where they are studied, and some of them posing bioterrorism agent risk. It is essential to develop SOPs for working with ticks and TBDs in these facilities as well as training researchers with these SOP’s. The biggest concern is the accidental release of an infected tick from the laboratory to environment. In order to conduct safe studies with ticks and tick-infested experimental animals, certain modifications must be done in facility, equipment, PPE, ticks and animal handling, storage of ticks, and infestation and housing of animals.

    Required modification in facility and laboratory equipment: If an ACL3 section has not been created, a suite within the BSL3 section should be reserved for tick studies. The multi-layer containment used for safe working with ticks consists of storage bottles, humified desiccant, tick chamber and laboratory room. Minimum required equipment and material should be kept in tick room in order to prevent hiding places in incidents. Feeding, inoculation and dissection of ticks should be performed in a non-ventilated glove boxes if possible. Magnifying loupes should be used while counting or handling ticks. Experimental animals infested with ticks should be housed in individually ventilated isolator cages. All work surfaces should be painted white. White adhesive pads should be placed in front of the door and double-sided sticky tapes should be applied around the doors and margins of the animal cages. Parts of mosquito nets should be used to cover the ventilation hoose openings to animal cages.

    Personal protective equipment: White, long cuffed regular gown, white and long neck gloves should be used. In BSL4 suit labs white suits should be used. If suit gloves are colored, an extra pair of white gloves should also be don over the suit gloves to ensure easy visualization of ticks.

    Tick handling and storage: Especially larvae and nymphal stages should be cooled prior to work by placing the vials on chill table. Studies should be planned with minimum tick individuals and counts in the lab always be documented. Eggs should be divided small portions before hatching and unnecessary parts destroyed. Tick containing vials should have a mesh under the cover. Vials should be kept in plastic desiccators. All vials should be labeled with necessary info.

    Animal (mice, rabbits, guinea pigs) infestation with ticks: Infestation capsules are the most secure tick infestation way in high containment labs whereas ear bags for rabbits or whole body infestation for mice can be the options in BSL2. Animals are sedated and capsules are glued on shaved skin to create a delimitated attachment site. Upper end of the capsules are sealed and secured with sticky tape. Stages and numbers of ticks placed in to capsules should be documented. Capsules are checked every day for integrity during infestation.

  10. From 17:00 to 17:30

    Biorisk Management of Athropods activities - TBC

    This session is open to offered presentations. Please upload your proposal here.

  11. From 8:46 to 9:10

    The International Expert Group of Biosafety and Biosecurity Regulators (IEGBBR)

    By Thomas Binz

    The IEGBBR is made up of national biosafety and/or biosecurity authorities that have strong oversight systems in place. The purpose of the IEGBBR is to provide a forum for the sharing of knowledge and experience with regard to current human and zoonotic animal pathogen issues. The issues discussed, however, can also intersect with the oversight of non-zoonotic animal and plant pathogens. One of the goals of the IEGBBR is to strengthen international biosafety and biosecurity by sharing expertise and lessons learned from the perspectives of the established regulatory systems with the global community. To do so, the IEGBBR develops reference tools and materials that are relevant to all countries, including developing countries and countries that already have established oversight frameworks. During the current funding term, the IEGBBR is developing a “Model of Standardized Regulatory Practices for Biosafety and Biosecurity Incidents”. Its anticipated completion is in August 2023. The IEGBBR has also initiated the Technical Expertise program, targeting developing regions. Its goal is to provide tailored technical expertise and enable beneficiaries to obtain help in areas of need or to address gaps in their biosafety/biosecurity oversight systems, enabling the strengthening of the national programs and the associated oversight measures.

    Website: https://iegbbr.org/

  12. From 9:10 to 9:35

    How to strengthen laboratory biosecurity within your organization: The importance of biosecurity awareness

    By Mirjam Schaap

    Tools to strengthening biosecurity implementation within organizations working with high-threat pathogens

    Due to their nature and characteristics, working in a laboratory with high-threat biological materials coincides with biosafety and biosecurity risks. Biosafety refers to working safely to reduce the risk of exposure and release, whereas biosecurity deals with the prevention of misuse. In general, biosecurity builds upon biosafety principles and procedures with additional security measures.

    Biosecurity awareness is of utmost importance to generate a safe and secure biosecurity culture within organizations. By being aware of the importance of biosecurity, both by management and employees, will ensure adequate biorisk management. “A chain is as strong as its weakest link”: not knowing the vulnerabilities your organization is facing, puts your organization at risk for biosecurity-breaches. With that in mind, the Netherlands Biosecurity Office developed several products and web applications with the aim to raise biosecurity awareness and to identify vulnerabilities regarding biosecurity within organizations. Besides an informative film, and gadgets to raise biosecurity awareness, the biosecurity toolkit also includes the ‘Biosecurity Self-scan Toolkit’ and the ‘Vulnerability Scan’. These are online tools to analyse biosecurity vulnerabilities and perform biorisk assessments in an organization dealing with high consequence pathogens. The content of the toolkit will be explained as well as how it can be applied to strengthen biosecurity within facilities working with high-threat pathogens.

    M. Schaap, I. Vennis, S. Rutjes, P. Hogervorst, S. Schulpen, M. Boot, M. Schuijff, N. Chung, R. Bleijs, Biosecurity Office, RIVM, Bilthoven, The Netherlands

  13. From 9:35 to 10:00

    Biosecurity in animal production to improve animal health and reduce antimicrobial use

    By Jeroen Dewulf

    Biosecurity in livestock production is a combination of many different measures aimed at prevention of introduction and spread of pathogens in a farm. It forms the basis of any disease control program. Both external and internal biosecurity measures are of utmost importance to either prevent introduction of pathogens on a farm and avoid infection spread between animal populations on a farm. Although most of the measures to be implemented are logical and generally easy to apply, it requires a strong discipline to adhere to the measures in the daily practices. Yet, those who do surely see the benefits.

  14. From 10:00 to 10:30

    A broad Biosecurity program in Greece

    By Joseph Papaparaskevas

    According to WHO, biosafety is the term to describe any procedures that protect the personnel against unintentional exposure to pathogens, thus: "the containment principles, technologies and practives that are implemented to prevent unintentional exposure to pathogens and toxins, or their accidental release".

    In contract, biosecurity is the term to describe the procedures against misuse of pathogenic materials, thus "institutional and personal security measures designed to prevent the loss, theft, misuse, diversion or intentional release of pathogens and toxins".

    These two terms, together with the Biorisk Management, which is the effective management of risk in laboratory, consist the three main pillars of prevention and management of ayn potential risk while working with Level III/IV pathogens and toxinx.

    During the last two decades, much progress has been made regarding especially biosafety (many leve III/IV labs have been commissioned worldwide an guidelines/procedures have been implemented dictating proper use of the pathogens). Nevertheless, this cannot be said to the same extent regarding biosecurity, where lack of specific legislation, or lack of implementation of the existing one delays progress in this area too.

    This presentation is going to access the biosecurity issue in Greece, what (little) has been done during the last twenty years and what needs to be done in order for the laboratories to establish and possess a broad biosecurity establishment and the personnel to work under a comprehensive biosecurity environment.

  15. From 11:00 to 11:40

    Break-out 1 - Biocides product regulation – challenges in biosafety

    By Dimiter Prodanov, Wendy Shell

    The Biocidal Products Regulation of the European Union (BPR, Regulation (EU) 528/2012) covers placing on the market and subsequent use of biocidal products, which are used to protect humans, animals, materials, or articles against harmful organisms, by the action of the active substances contained in the biocidal product. In order to safeguard workers and the environment, contaminated material must be inactivated before reuse or disposal, so that exposure is avoided. For this purpose, chemical disinfectants are often used. These products fall under the definition of biocides. Biocides act against pathogens and pests but also include genetically modified cells. More specifically, such biocides include ‘disinfectants and algaecides not intended for direct application to humans or animals’ (product type 2, PT2), and ‘products used for veterinary hygiene’ (PT3). For this purpose, only registered and authorized biocides may be used. The result is that many disinfectants, regularly used in scientific or diagnostic activities with pathogens and/or genetically modified organisms, are not allowed to be purchased and/or used according to BPR, although they are proven effective and validated. The EBSA BPR task force was launched in 2020 to address these challenges on the European level. In this breakout session, we give an overview of the steps taken by the EBSA BPR task force and the actions being taken for possible solutions in different European countries.

  16. From 11:00 to 11:40

    Break-out 2 - Emerging Diseases in EasternEurope/mediterranean region

    By Kritas Spyridon, Daniela Morelli

    African swine fever (ASF) virus (genus Asfivirus, family Asfarviridae) has been maintained for hundreds of years in sub-Saharan Africa in latently infected warthogs, bush pigs and giant forest hogs as reservoir with the assistance of soft ticks of the genus Ornithodorus as biological vectors. However, in 2007 it affected domestic pig populations in Georgia (as well as some decades ago in Spain) after consumption of undercooked ship's kitchen scraps. Since then the disease has spread to wild boars and intensively reared domesticated pigs in Eastern European countries, but also in China with huge losses for the agricultural economies of the affected states. The path that followed probably mainly blames the role of man rather than wild boar in the transmission of the disease. Outbreaks of this disease also occurred in Belgium, Italy, Germany, Romania, Serbia, North Macedonia and Bulgaria. In 2018, the Greek Ministry of Rural Development and Food launched an information campaign for those involved (veterinarians, pig farmers, foresters, hunters, customs officers, etc.) in order to prevent the appearance of this devastating disease in our country as well, which seemed to have an effect if we exclude the momentary appearance of a case in Nigrita Serres on February 2020. Since then a new case in two wild boars appeared after 3 years in the same area, In this work, the ways of transmission of this disease and the points where humans are involved will be presented, and possible methods of limiting it will be discussed. The components of modern pig farming internationally are complex and extend from the location and construction of farms, the microclimate, supplies and movements of animals, personnel and materials, commercial transactions, etc.

    The principles of external and internal biosecurity applicable to many infectious diseases of animals will be presented focusing on the problem of this important disease

  17. From 11:00 to 11:40

    Break out 5 - BioRisk challenges in relation to contained activities on Prion (like) Diseases

    By Marcel van Bergen, Ulrika Allard Bengtsson
    progressive and always fatal. As a consequence of these serious diseases, some of the veterinary prion diseases are subject to trade restrictions, because the meat could be infectious. As a result this leads to intensive sampling and laboratory analysis, with high costs.
    Because the infectious nature of prions is not well characterized and destruction of these particles goes beyond the techniques typically required for biohazard inactivation, work with these agents requires special considerations for biocontainment to minimize both occupational and environmental exposure risk.
    In this break-out session we aim to:
    1. Give an overview of what is considered as prion-like diseases from both Human and Veterinary perspective;
    2. Identify Biorisk challenges in working with prions from Diagnostic and Research perspective;
    3. Discuss Biorisks in relation to working with these pathogenic agents.

  18. From 11:00 to 11:40

    Break out 6 - Human factors. "Local rationality" and the difference between intentional and unintentional human failures

    By Vibeke Halkjaer-Knudsen
    Recent years have seen significantly increased awareness of the need to improve the management of health and safety in laboratories, and, in particular, to reduce the potential for incidents posing a significant risk of fatality or serious injury. Studies have reported up to 30% of scientists working in academic laboratories as having witnessed an injury at work severe enough to warrant attention from a medical professional. This presentation is focusing on approaches to understanding and learning about why the individuals involved in incidents may have acted as they did.

  19. From 11:50 to 12:30

    Break-out 1 - Biocides product regulation – challenges in biosafety

    By Dimiter Prodanov, Wendy Shell

    The Biocidal Products Regulation of the European Union (BPR, Regulation (EU) 528/2012) covers placing on the market and subsequent use of biocidal products, which are used to protect humans, animals, materials, or articles against harmful organisms, by the action of the active substances contained in the biocidal product. In order to safeguard workers and the environment, contaminated material must be inactivated before reuse or disposal, so that exposure is avoided. For this purpose, chemical disinfectants are often used. These products fall under the definition of biocides. Biocides act against pathogens and pests but also include genetically modified cells. More specifically, such biocides include ‘disinfectants and algaecides not intended for direct application to humans or animals’ (product type 2, PT2), and ‘products used for veterinary hygiene’ (PT3). For this purpose, only registered and authorized biocides may be used. The result is that many disinfectants, regularly used in scientific or diagnostic activities with pathogens and/or genetically modified organisms, are not allowed to be purchased and/or used according to BPR, although they are proven effective and validated. The EBSA BPR task force was launched in 2020 to address these challenges on the European level. In this breakout session, we give an overview of the steps taken by the EBSA BPR task force and the actions being taken for possible solutions in different European countries.

  20. From 11:50 to 12:30

    Break-out 2 - Emerging Diseases in EasternEurope/mediterranean region

    By Kritas Spyridon, Daniela Morelli

    African swine fever (ASF) virus (genus Asfivirus, family Asfarviridae) has been maintained for hundreds of years in sub-Saharan Africa in latently infected warthogs, bush pigs and giant forest hogs as reservoir with the assistance of soft ticks of the genus Ornithodorus as biological vectors. However, in 2007 it affected domestic pig populations in Georgia (as well as some decades ago in Spain) after consumption of undercooked ship's kitchen scraps. Since then the disease has spread to wild boars and intensively reared domesticated pigs in Eastern European countries, but also in China with huge losses for the agricultural economies of the affected states. The path that followed probably mainly blames the role of man rather than wild boar in the transmission of the disease. Outbreaks of this disease also occurred in Belgium, Italy, Germany, Romania, Serbia, North Macedonia and Bulgaria. In 2018, the Greek Ministry of Rural Development and Food launched an information campaign for those involved (veterinarians, pig farmers, foresters, hunters, customs officers, etc.) in order to prevent the appearance of this devastating disease in our country as well, which seemed to have an effect if we exclude the momentary appearance of a case in Nigrita Serres on February 2020. Since then a new case in two wild boars appeared after 3 years in the same area, In this work, the ways of transmission of this disease and the points where humans are involved will be presented, and possible methods of limiting it will be discussed. The components of modern pig farming internationally are complex and extend from the location and construction of farms, the microclimate, supplies and movements of animals, personnel and materials, commercial transactions, etc.

    The principles of external and internal biosecurity applicable to many infectious diseases of animals will be presented focusing on the problem of this important disease

  21. From 11:50 to 12:30

    Break out 5 - BioRisk challenges in relation to contained activities on Prion (like) Diseases

    By Marcel van Bergen, Ulrika Allard Bengtsson
    Prion diseases or transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) are a family of rare progressive and always fatal. As a consequence of these serious diseases, some of the veterinary prion diseases are subject to trade restrictions, because the meat could be infectious. As a result this leads to intensive sampling and laboratory analysis, with high costs.
    Because the infectious nature of prions is not well characterized and destruction of these particles goes beyond the techniques typically required for biohazard inactivation, work with these agents requires special considerations for biocontainment to minimize both occupational and environmental exposure risk.
    In this break-out session we aim to:
    1. Give an overview of what is considered as prion-like diseases from both Human and Veterinary perspective;
    2. Identify Biorisk challenges in working with prions from Diagnostic and Research perspective;
    3. Discuss Biorisks in relation to working with these pathogenic agents.
  22. From 11:50 to 12:30

    Break out 6 - Human factors. "Local rationality" and the difference between intentional and unintentional human failures

    By Vibeke Halkjaer-Knudsen
    Recent years have seen significantly increased awareness of the need to improve the management of health and safety in laboratories, and, in particular, to reduce the potential for incidents posing a significant risk of fatality or serious injury. Studies have reported up to 30% of scientists working in academic laboratories as having witnessed an injury at work severe enough to warrant attention from a medical professional. This presentation is focusing on approaches to understanding and learning about why the individuals involved in incidents may have acted as they did.
  23. From 13:31 to 14:00

    Evidence-based risk analyses for Maximum Containment Laboratories

    By Andreas Kurth

    This paper discusses a previously unrecognized contradiction in the design of biosafety level-4 (BSL-4) suit laboratories, also known as maximum or high containment laboratories. For decades, it is suggested that both directional airflow and pressure differentials are essential safety measures to prevent the release of pathogens into the environment and to avoid cross-contamination between laboratory rooms. Despite the absence of an existing evidence-based risk analyses demonstrating increased safety by directional airflow and pressure differentials in BSL-4 laboratories, they were anchored in various national regulations. Currently, the construction and operation of BSL-4 laboratories are subject to rigorous quality and technical requirements including airtight containment. Over time, BSL-4 laboratories evolved to enormously complex technical infrastructures. With the aim to counterbalance this development towards technical simplification while still maintaining maximum safety, we provide a detailed risk analysis by calculating pathogen mitigation in maximum contamination scenarios. The results presented and discussed herein, indicate that both directional airflow or a differential pressure gradient in airtight rooms within a secondary BSL-4 containment do not increase biosafety, and are not necessary. Likewise, reduction of pressure zones from the outside into the secondary containment may also provide sufficient environmental protection. We encourage laboratory design professionals to consider technical simplification and policymakers to adapt corresponding legislation and regulations surrounding directional airflow and pressure differentials for technically airtight BSL-4 laboratories.

  24. From 14:00 to 14:30

    Showering-out in polio essential facilities: from requirement to evidence-based consideration

    By Patrick Rüdelsheim

    Why was the requirement for exit showering replaced with performance-based language in the 2022 version of the WHO Global Action Plan for Poliovirus Containment? Supporting evidence was prepared by Perseus taking a double approach: literature searches on the effectiveness of showering-out procedures and consultation of different types of organisations with relevant experience and challenges. We will highlight the results and show how such information informed the adapted GAPIV requirements.

  25. From 14:30 to 15:00

    BioSafteyCabinets mythbusters: Does heat really affect my protection?

    By Kara Held
    INTRODUCTION:
    Keeping a contamination free environment in the laboratory has commonly been achieved by one of two ways: a flame or a biosafety cabinet (BSC). However, it has been frequently observed that these two practices have been combined, where a heat source has been used within the BSC. As flames require flammable gasses and cause hot air to rise, it was hypothesized that these could lead to a loss of BSC Containment, as BSCs rely on unidirectional downflow air.
    OBJECTIVES:
    The objective of this study was to determine whether BSCs can maintain Containment when a heat source is operated within the work area.
    METHODS: Several heat sources (Bunsen burner, High Heat Bunsen Burner, Spirit Lamp and Bacti-cinerator) were placed within two sizes of BSCs (4-foot and 6-foot), and smoke was used to visualize airflow disturbances, air cleanliness was measured by particle counting , and aerosol microbiological testing was conducted to ascertian Containment. The risk of introducing a flammable gas into a BSC was also calculated.

    RESULTS:
    Large flamed Bunsen burners were found to have the most detrimental effects on the ability of the BSC to maintain Containment, especially in the center of the work area, while the smaller heat sources were more variable. Containment was completely lost in the 4-foot BSC, whereas the 6-foot BSC was capable of maintaining Containment in only a few conditions. The BSC was also calculated to be able to maintain the required volume of flammable gas needed to operate the burners, not taking into consideration unintended leaks.

    CONCLUSIONS:
    Overall, it was determined that BSCs cannot operate safely and reliably while housing a heat source, as it could cause unexpected contamination of the work or the worker, or BSC ignition or explosion.
  26. From 15:00 to 15:30

    Empirical Studies in Biosafety

    By Kelly Kim

    In this session, we will present data from our empirical work in biosafety and our work exploiting existing data sets to inform biosafety. Overall, we hope this talk will illustrate how relatively simple experiments in biosafety can be conducted to close longstanding data gaps in bio-risk management and also inform reproducibility in the life sciences. We will discuss our methodological framework for studying aerosols generated by laboratory accidents, and present information on the aerosols produced by dropping microtiter plates and tissue culture flasks. Also in the physical sciences, we will present data on the rate that conical centrifuge tubes leak and the frequency that splashes occur when opening microcentrifuge tubes via various opening methods. We will discuss the rate of spills and splashes when pipetting as drawn from experiments using volunteers and blinded samples in clinical laboratories. We will describe factors that influence this accident rate including workload and experience of the researcher. Interestingly, this experiment also sheds light on the ability of the researcher to know when they are making mistakes and take corrective action. We will present data on the rate at which needle sticks can be expected in the laboratory. We will examine how biosafety findings are distributed amongst laboratories in several institutions and what can be learned about the culture of biosafety. We will discuss how knowledge of the frequency and causes of accidents can lead to means to improve reproducibility in the life sciences.

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Prices

Ticket type Price
Non-Member conference ticket 2023 € 710.00
Non-member conference ticket 2023 + conference dinner € 780.00
Non-member conference ticket 2023 + conference dinner + printed conference book € 810.00
Non-member conference ticket 2023 + printed conference book € 740.00

                                    | EBSA member | non member
Register before
January 16th 2022
Super Early Bird
Conference ticket             |            440 €    |     570 €
Printed conference book  |              25 €    |       25 €
Conference dinner           |              65 €    |       65 €


Register before
February 13th 2023
Conference ticket             |            505 €    |     605 €
Printed conference book  |              30 €    |       30 €
Conference dinner           |              70 €    |       70 €

Register from
February 13th 2023 onwards
Conference ticket             |            605 €    |     710 €
Printed conference book  |              30 €    |       30 €
Conference dinner           |              70 €    |       70 €

All prices are including Greek VAT

Invoices for attending the conference (and courses) will be done by our VAT partner for Greece

VMC  
1 Rond-point de l’Europe
92250 La Garenne-Colombes
France

Greek VAT Number: EL997156908 
French VAT Number: FR75523098614


 

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