Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention
The 7th Review Conference of the BTWC took place 5 to 22 December 2011 in Geneva
At the poster session of 8 December 2011, EBSA, through Ursula Jenal, presented a general poster about its activities. The poster was well received. However, due to the large number of activities, the poster session was visited only by a limited number of participants. None of the other Bio-safety Associations were present.
At the NGO session of 7 December 2011, IFBA gave a statement. In this statement the importance of collaboration with international, regional and national biosafety associations was high-lighted: "Biosafety associations are focused on strengthening the profession of biosafety, while the con-vention aims at preventing disease from being used to deliberately cause harm. In the age of biorisk management there is an increased need to harmonize efforts to achieve our common goals. However, with resource constraints being a constant challenge for all, working together not only makes sense, it is critical for future success. The biosafety community should work with states parties to build biosafety and biosecurity capacity in developing countries-with a particular focus on raising awareness among biosafety professionals about the convention and dual-use issues."
Vertic (Verification Research, Training and Information Centre), at their side event on 14 December 2011, presented an overview of the status of national legislation for BWC implementation and expansion to cover UNSCR 1540 regarding the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The database can be accessed at http://www.vertic.org/pages/homepage/databases/bwc-legislation-database/introduction.php.
The Belgian delegation at their side event on the 'Biological Weapon Convention, Biosecurity and the Industry' on 15 December 2011 presented an industry perspective to biosafety and biosecurity (see reference below) and strongly promoted the transfer of CWA15793 (2008) Biorisk Management Standard to an ISO Standard. The interest in this transition by the quite large number of participants was very high and no opposition came up. A representative of ISO stated the interest of his organisation to facilitate this work. If EBSA would like to promote the transition, an important step would be to ask EBSA members to contact their national standardisation organisations and inform them about the process that might get started and possibly participate in the process.
The U.S. National Academies of Science at their side event on 15 December presented a report on their Workshop on 'Biosecurity Challenges of the Global Expansion of high Containment Biological Laboratories'. The question was raised how many high containment laboratories were necessary to fulfil the global need for public health, biosafety and biosecurity. It was stated that currently in the U.S. 2000 level 3 laboratories were registered. It was estimated that if one laboratory was necessary for about half a million people, we would have to have roughly 14,000 level 3 labs world-wide. A problem was seen in the limited resources that certain countries had and that no standard training has been set up for people working in these laboratories. Also in the context of laboratory acquired infections still happening, psychological testing of employees was discussed and the possibility to stay away from work when personal problems could pose a significant distraction from working safely. The Academies recommended that a scientific advisory board should be established as a focal point for recommendations on high containment laboratories to the BWC. It was also noted that biosafety associations were important focal points for interaction and connection of national, regional and international entities. It might be interesting to have a presentation of this workshop given at the next EBSA conference (see reference below).
According to the final report on the outcome of the Conference a number of decisions addressing biosafety and biosecurity and relevant to EBSA have been taken:
An intersessional programme 2012-2015 with annual Meetings of States Parties preceded by annual Meetings of Experts will take place with focus on cooperation and strengthening of national implementation and participation in Confidence Building Measures.
National implementation should be strengthened through national, regional and international measures to improve laboratory biosafety and security of pathogens and toxins.
Cooperation and assistance should be strengthened, among other means, through capacity-building, through international cooperation, in biosafety and biosecurity.
In the context of Confidence Building Measures States Parties agreed to provide information
The Conference noted the value of national implementation measures, as appropriate, in accordance with the constitutional process of each State Party. That is:
a) implement voluntary management standards on biosafety and biosecurity;
b) encourage the consideration of development of appropriate arrangements to promote awareness among relevant professionals in the private and public sectors and throughout relevant scientific and administrative activities and;
c) promote amongst those working in the biological sciences awareness of the obligations of States Parties under the Convention, as well as relevant national legislation and guidelines;
d) promote the development of training and education programmes for those granted access to biological agents and toxins relevant to the Convention and for those with the knowledge or capacity to modify such agents and toxins;
e) encourage the promotion of a culture of responsibility amongst relevant national professionals and the voluntary development, adoption and promulgation of codes of conduct; 9
Publications of interest:
Biosecurity Challenges of the Global Expansion of High Containment Biological Laboratories, Summary of a Workshop, US National Academy of Sciences and National Research Council, available at www.nap.edu
Global Perspectives on Re-Envisaging the Biological Weapons Convention, The Nonproliferation Review, November 2011, 18(3), http://cns.miis.edu/npr/18-3.htm
Setting a Standard for stakeholder ship. Industry Contribution to a strengthened Biological and Toxin weapons Convention, Egmont Papers of the Royal Institute of International Relations, Dec. 2011, No 52, http://www.egmontinstitute.be/paper_egm.html
Dual Use Research, Office of Biotechnology Activities, U.S. National Institutes of Health, http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/biosecurity.html
Questions or request for additional information can be directed to Ursula Jenal